Did Hitler really want Stalingrad so bad because it was named after Stalin?
What should the Germans have done regarding the late 1942 to early 1943 period? (I know the real answer is not to fight a two front war)
Had the Germans just swung south in to the Caucasus and destroyed the oil wells, storage and refineries then retreated back into the Ukraine into more defensible positions, would that have altered the eastern front? (I know Hitler was never for retreating) They could have baited the Soviets into attacks then countered attacked on their terms. I know the Germans wanted/needed oil and the Caucasus had plenty but denying the Soviets of oil would have wrecked havoc on their army/war economy.
Hitler did not mention Stalingrad by name until issuing Directive 45 on July 23, 1942. The Red Army had been making a determined stand along the Don River Bend so Hitler decided to get the offensive moving by splitting Army Group South. Originally the plan had been to march to the Volga River and the Caucus Mountains in succession but frustrated by the Soviet defense along the Don Hitler ordered them taken simultaneously. German supplies had been carefully accumulated for the planned moment and Hitler completely derailed the German supply situation with that decision. Germany barely had enough to undertake the offensive at all and no where near enough to support a simultaneous drive to the Volga and Caucus.
Stalingrad was actually a pretty significant objective. That area of the Soviet Union was very sparsely populated and devoid of geographic features. Pretty only much open steppe with a couple of major rivers and very small towns were around Stalingrad. Not only was Stalingrad a major industrial city but it was also the only place where a railroad connected the Dnieper and Volga Rivers. However as the battle wore on the Germans were not able to entirely capture the place Hitler become more motivated by ideological reasons.
As for the oil fields in the Caucus Mountains the Germans never considered a large-scale type raid that you suggested. Of course had the Germans taken the oil fields and were forced to retreat later they would have set the refineries on fire. But as it was the only significant oil field in Caucuses the Germans took was at Maikop which had been destroyed by the retreating Red Army. The Germans were never able to get any oil from the Caucuses. As the logistical support of Army Group A collapsed and the Red Army defenses stiffened in the hilly and mountainous terrain Hitler did order the Luftwaffe to conduct large-scale strategic of the oil fields. This effort continued well into 1943 long after Army Group A had retreated back towards the Crimea. But in the end no consequential damage was ever done to the oil fields, aside from Maikop.
The main critiques of the offensive have been:
1.) splitting Army Group South when there was not enough supplies for two separate offensives at the same time. This would completely immobile Army Group A by the end of September.
2.) becoming fixated on Stalingrad after the Volga had been reached. The Germans actually reached the Volga on the very first day of the offensive, August 23, about 5 kilometers to the north of Stalingrad. While Stalingrad would have at least needed to have been partially secured Hitler ordered the attacks to continue well into November. From September 13 to November 19, 1942 the Germans had taken close to 180,000 casualties in and around Stalingrad.
3.) not releasing the 9. Armee and diverting the 11. Armee. During the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 Stalingrad was not the largest battle on the East. 9. Armee of 30 divisions held the Rzhev Salient which was relentlessly attacked by the Red Army. Before the offensive began the German General Staff had advocated the massive 9. Armee be move to protect the flanks of 6. Armee. Additionally after 11. Armee had conquered Sevastopol to end the Crimean Campaign Hitler had ordered the 11. Armee be moved to Army Group North to take Leningrad, an offensive that of course never took place. So instead of poorly trained, equipped, and often low morale Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian troops protecting the flanks of the 6. Armee there could have been high quality German troops.